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文 | 胡星 汇业律师事务所 合伙人

美国证券法律、会计、监管制度与国内均不同，为何要写SEC监管案例分析？一则因为，SEC动辄几十页控诉状，对比国内证监会和交易所几页纸的公函和决定书，会披露更多的案情细节可供分析琢磨；二则小法认为，两个不同证券体系下流动的商业交易本质，其实有很多共通之处。为此，在SEC监管案例系列中，小法会尽量跳开美国体系下特有之处，更多探讨相同、相似之处，以给读者关于国内上市公司监管与合规更多思考的灵感。

本文案例涉及SEC在2020年10月8日发布的公告（No.2020-251），控诉SAE公司及4位前高管（“涉案高管”）涉嫌会计欺诈。会计欺诈行为涉及持续多年虚增收入约1亿美元及涉案高管隐瞒盗用公司资金数百万美元。

SEC控诉状49页，小法在本文中对SEC控诉状的摘录，侧重于讨论：

（1）SAE公司隐瞒关联关系的手段，以增加读者在尽职调查等实务工作中识别隐蔽关联方的经验；

（2）SAE公司通过隐蔽关联方虚增收入的套路；

（3）会计欺诈赔偿责任的相关美国证券法规。

本文英文部分（含序号）摘自SEC控诉状原文，中文部分含小法对案情的分析并按中文阅读习惯书写，非逐句翻译，亦省略非关键信息。若想更好了解本案，建议英文部分一并阅读。

Factual Allegations事实指控

Defendants被告涉案方

1.This enforcement action arises from an elaborate, four­year­long fraud by Defendant SAExploration Holdings, Inc. (“SAE” or the “Company”) and four former senior SAE executives, Jeffrey H. Hastings (former Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of SAE’s Board of Directors), Brent N. Whiteley (former Chief Financial Officer and General Counsel), Brian A. Beatty (former Chief Operations Officer and, prior to that, Chief Executive Officer), and Michael J. Scott (former Executive Vice President of Operations).

2.SAE is a publicly traded seismic data acquisition company. SAE’s customers, mainly large oil and gas companies, hire SAE to collect (or “shoot”) proprietary seismic survey data used to identify and assess potential drilling locations. SAE historically struggled to maintain sufficient cash flow – a problem only exacerbated by a decline in oil prices beginning in late 2014 and into early 2015.

本案涉事公司SAE公司主营业务系向大型油气公司客户提供地震数据，因2014年底开始油价下跌，SAE出现现金流吃紧。本案涉事高管：Hastings（前CEO兼董事长）、Whiteley（前CFO兼法律总顾问）、Beatty（前COO）、Scott（前运营执行总裁）。

A.The Defendants Created A Purportedly Unaffiliated Data Library Company

通过隐蔽关联方虚增收入的套路：涉案高管设立表面上非关联的数据库公司

3.From as early as February 2015 through August 2019 (the “Relevant Period”), SAE and Hastings, Whiteley, Beatty, and Scott (the “SAE Executives”), devised and carried out a fraud to improperly recognize approximately $100 million of revenue from transactions with a purportedly legitimate and unrelated customer, Alaskan SeismicVentures, LLC (“ASV”). In truth, however, ASV was created by the SAE Executives and controlled by Hastings and Whiteley.

自2015年2月至2019年8月（“涉案期间”），SAE与Hastings, Whiteley, Beatty和Scott（“涉案高管”）在涉案期间，通过与ASV的交易，以欺诈手段不适当确认约1亿美元收入。ASV表面看似一家SAE非关联方公司，但实际上，其背后由SAE涉案高管设立，并由Hastings和Whiteley实际控制。

34.Creating a purportedly unaffiliated entity to operate the data library offered three primary benefits.

36.Second, if the data library company appeared to be an unaffiliated third party, SAE could potentially recognize the revenue as it “sold” data to the third­party special purpose entity (“SPE”) – without having to identify and contract with actual end ­user customers.

设立ASV这样一家形式上非关联而实质上关联的数据库公司，对SAE有三个好处，其中之一就是，SAE确认收入的时点是SAE将数据“销售”给ASV之时，而在该等收入确认之前，SAE不需要确认ASV的最终用户是否实际存在。

40.In April 2015, Hastings recruited a business acquaintance, a former Director of the State of Alaska Oil and Gas Division, to establish a seismic data library company (the “ASV Owner”). Hastings’ business acquaintance formed ASV as an Alaska limited liability company in May 2015. None of the SAE Executives were identified on ASV’s organization documents. The ASV Owner was ASV’s sole employee and operated it out of a bedroom in his personal residence. 

ASV公司成立于2015年4月，公司仅有一名雇员，同时也是公司唯一股东（“ASV所有者”），此人系Hastings业务熟人。另外，没有一名涉案高管的名字出现在ASV组织架构文件中。

41.On July 1, 2015, SAE entered into a Master Services Agreement (“MSA”) with ASV, whereby SAE contracted to collect seismic data for ASV. The ASV Owner signed the MSA for ASV, and Scott signed on behalf of SAE. Soon thereafter, SAE and ASV executed five work orders pursuant to the MSA, for five data exploration locations in Alaska. Scott signed the first two work orders on behalf of SAE.

2015年7月，SAE与ASV签订《总服务协议》，依此协议SAE向ASV提供地震数据。ASV所有者代表ASV签订该协议，Scott代表SAE签订该协议。

42.Although ASV was structured as a purportedly independent third party, Hastings and Whiteley effectively controlled ASV, as Beatty and Scott knew or were reckless in not knowing. Whiteley provided administrative and operational support to the ASV Owner, including, for example, providing him with contract templates and identifying potential financing opportunities for ASV. In addition, Hastings, Whiteley, and Scott located customers to license data from ASV – including customers who previously had purchased data directly from SAE. Indeed, SAE employees even negotiated directly with SAE customers on behalf of ASV.

对于这家表面上毫无关系的公司，涉案高管可谓操碎了心。比如，Whiteley向ASV所有者提供行政运营支持，包括提供合同范本和潜在融资机会。Hastings, Whiteley和Scott帮助ASV寻找客户购买数据，其中有些客户甚至以前曾向SAE购买数据。甚至有，SAE职员以ASV公司名义与SAE客户进行业务谈判。

B.The SAE Executives Misappropriated from SAE $12 Million and Covertly Invested Approximately Half In ASV

隐瞒关联关系的手段：涉案高管从SAE盗取1200万美元，将其中约600万美元隐蔽投资于ASV公司

43.Beginning in June 2015, SAE began recognizing as revenue amounts owed to it by ASV. From the time of ASV’s creation in May 2015, the SAE Executives understood that ASV did not have sufficient funds to pay SAE pursuant to the MSA and that to pay SAE, ASV would need to generate cash from various sources, including finding third parties to license the data collected, by monetizing ASV’s Alaska Tax Credits, or otherwise finding sources of equity for ASV.

But, as of the fall of 2015 (and throughout the Relevant Period), ASV had only limited sales to licensees – and nothing close to what SAE recognized as revenue from its sales to ASV. Because ASV lacked funds to pay SAE amounts due under the MSA, SAE’s accounts receivable balance from ASV began to increase substantially over time. For example, by the end of 2015, SAE had recorded $83 million in revenue from ASV – $50 million of which remained outstanding as an account receivable.

ASV自2015年设立后，从其客户获取的数据授权业务收入极其有限，导致ASV对SAE出现大量应付款，与SAE确认的销售收入形成强烈反差。比如，2015年末，SAE确认从ASV销售收入为8300万美元，但其中5000万美元为应收款，占60%。

试想一下，若一家公司的客户应付款比例已高达全部交易额60%，而该公司既不修改合同条款增加违约金、亦不修改账期，仍按现状继续与客户做生意，不可疑吗？涉案高管当然都想到了这一点，所以，为ASV公司增加现金流，成了SAE涉案高管费尽心思的共同任务。

48.The SAE Executives knew that an overt investment by SAE in ASV would derail their plan. At a minimum, it would render ASV an SAE affiliate, requiring consolidation of ASV into SAE’s financial statements and precluding the recognition of revenue from SAE’s transactions with ASV. It would also reduce the amount of Alaska Tax Credits that ASV would receive.

49.By no later than October 2015, the SAE Executives were aware of and actively participating in the illegal plan to make a covert equity investment in ASV, including by devising a plan to route funds from SAE, through various shell companies created and controlled by Whiteley and Hastings, to ASV.

涉案高管心里清楚，若关联关系暴露，ASV将作为关联方并入SAE合并报表，SAE从ASV确认的收入也将合并抵销，由此SAE合并财务报表上收入科目的金额将出现大幅下滑。为此，涉案高管积极谋划，将从SAE盗取的资金，通过隐蔽股权投资的方式投入到ASV。具体手段是，通过设立Whiteley和Hastings控制的4家空壳公司，以实现资金闭环。

63.The below diagram demonstrates the flow of misappropriated funds from SAE to ASV, specifically:

a.the misappropriation of $12 million via transfers to Global Equipment;

b.the routing of $5.9 million, through shell companies, to ASV; and

c.the round tripping of $5.8 million back to SAE in December 2015.

Round Tripping of Nearly $6 Million in Misappropriated SAE Funds

上述图表系SEC调查出来的涉案高管一手操纵的隐蔽资金闭环。除SAE、ASV，其余4家公司Global Equipment (“GES”), Forza, Madison River 和Palmyra均系涉案高管控制的假冒空壳公司。

C.The SAE Executives “Round Tripped” Nearly $6 Million Through ASV and Back To SAE To Create the False Impression ASV Was Paying SAE

隐瞒关联关系的手段：通过假冒空壳公司，进行隐蔽股权投资，实现资金闭环

50.Global Equipment was a sham company created by the SAE Executives in September 2015. In 2015 and 2016, Scott created fake and back­dated purchase orders and supporting documentation purporting to provide for SAE’s rental of equipment from Global Equipment for seismic­data surveys SAE had been conducting. In addition, Whiteley directed the drafting of a fake lease agreement between SAE and Global Equipment and of fake invoices from Global Equipment to SAE.

51.But Global Equipment did not actually own any such survey equipment, and the non­existent rentals were fabricated in order to provide a cover story for the misappropriation and routing of SAE money to ASV.

53.Between October 2015 and December 2016, the SAE Executives caused SAE to transfer approximately $12 million to Global Equipment.

第一步：SAE将盗取的1200万美元资金，通过虚构的设备租赁交易，转移至空壳公司GES。在此虚构业务中，Scott伪造、倒签租赁设备的订单和支持性文件；Whiteley指示起草虚假的租赁协议、发票；而实际上GES公司不拥有任何租赁设备可供出租。

56.In October and November 2015, Whiteley caused $6.3 million to be transferred from Global Equipment to two additional shell companies he and Hastings controlled. First, on or about October 26, 2015, Whiteley caused $3 million to be sent from Global Equipment to Forza Investments, an entity he controlled and created. Second, in November 2015, Whiteley caused an additional $3.3 million to be sent from Global Equipment to Madison River Investments, an entity Hastings controlled and created.

57.Next, approximately $6.1 million was transferred from Forza Investments and Madison River Investments – via a $2.8 million transfer in November 2015 and a $3.28 million transfer in December 2015, respectively – to a third entity called Palmyra Energy. Whiteley directed his neighbor to form Palmyra Energy in or around September 2015, to invest in ASV. To date, Palmyra Energy has received funds from no sources other than Forza Investments and Madison River Investments.

58.On or around December 4, 2015, Palmyra Energy used $5.9 million of the $6.1 million from Forza Investments and Madison River Investments to invest in ASV. As a result, Palmyra Energy – and in turn Whiteley and Hastings, who controlled Palmyra Energy – obtained an 85% ownership stake in ASV.

第二步，Whiteley安排将GES公司收到的1200万美元中630万美元，分两笔分别支付给另2家空壳公司Forza（Whiteley设立和控制）和Madison River（Hastings设立和控制）。

第三步，Forza和Madison River 将收到的资金转移给第4家空壳公司Palmyra（Whiteley指示其邻居设立）。Palmyra从2015年设立至SEC控诉之日，没有Forza和Madison River之外的任何资金来源。

第四步，Palmyra将收到的资金，以股权投资的方式投资ASV公司85%股权。

通过前述四步骤，涉案高管将从SAE盗取的1200万美元资金中约600万美元转移至ASV，ASV用此资金支付对SAE的业务款待付支票，以降低SAE财务报表上应收款金额，进而隐藏其会计欺诈违法行为。剩余600万美元，涉案高管通过空壳公司和虚假文件等相似手段，私吞至个人账户。

Materially False and Misleading Statements in SAE’s Public FilingsSAE

公开披露中的重大虚假、误导性陈述

通过上述“事实指控”部分，我们了解到SAE通过4家空壳公司及众多虚假交易文件，隐瞒关联关系，进而虚增约1亿美元营业收入，由此当然会引发SAE及涉案高管在上市公司定期财报、公告等披露中一系列重大虚假、误导性陈述。该等重大虚假、误导性陈述与国内情形类似，具体有：

82.SAE’s financial statements were materially false because, contrary to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), SAE recognized revenue and disclosed accounts receivable balances from ASV as if the revenue and receivables were generated from legitimate, substantive transactions with an unaffiliated company, which Hastings, Whiteley, and Beatty knew was not true. 

将SAE与ASV大量的商业交易按照与一家合法非关联方进行交易来确认和披露收入、应收款，该等会计处理违反GAAP准则，系重大虚假陈述；

83.From the second quarter of 2015 through the second quarter of 2016, SAE recognized $141 million in revenue from ASV. Of that amount, only $40 million was generated from legitimate end­user licensees. As a result, SAE materially overstated its revenue by approximately $100 million from the second quarter of 2015 through the second quarter of 2016 – which constituted approximately 36% of SAE’s revenue reported in its financial statements for the period. Accordingly, SAE’s Forms 10­Q for that period and its Forms 10­K for 2015 and 2016 were materially false.

84.Likewise, SAE’s subsequent Forms 10­K and 10­Q, from the third quarter of 2016 through the first quarter of 2019, were also materially false because they either incorporated the artificially­inflated revenue from 2015 and/or 2016 or materially overstated accounts receivable owed by ASV.

85.In addition, SAE’s Forms 8­K incorporating and attaching SAE’s quarterly and annual earnings releases for the period June 2015 through March 2019 – all 16 of which Whiteley signed – were also materially false.

在某一财报期间，SAE确认来自ASV的1.41亿美元销售收入中，只有0.4亿美元来自于ASV的真实客户，因此，SAE虚增收入1亿美元，占当期全部收入比例高达36%。由于收入虚增，SAE财务报表中应收款、收益科目也虚增。

87.SAE’s public filings during the same period, in particular SAE’s Forms 10­K and 10­Q, contained the following, additional material misstatements and omissions made by SAE, Hastings, Whiteley, and Beatty:

a. They materially mischaracterized ASV as a legitimate third­party customer, responsible for large percentages of SAE’s revenue. For example, SAE’s 2016 Form 10­K, signed by Hastings and Beatty, identified ASV as a customer accounting for more than 10% in consolidated revenue that year but did not disclose that the revenue was improperly recognized.

虚假称述ASV是一家为SAE贡献高比例营收的合法第三方客户，该虚假陈述系重大虚假陈述； 

c.They contained materially misleading related party information by failing to  disclose or include ASV as a related party. For example, SAE’s 2016 Form 10­K disclosed certain related parties owned and controlled by Hastings but did not identify ASV as a related party created by the SAE Executives and controlled by Hastings or Whiteley.

未披露ASV是关联方，导致重大误导性关联方信息披露；

d.They contained materially misleading executive­ compensation information by failing to include amounts misappropriated by the SAE Executives. For example, SAE’s 2016 Form 10­K incorporated by reference SAE’s 2017 Proxy Statement, which provided 2016 compensation information for the SAE Executives but failed to disclose the amounts each obtained from SAE through the fraudulent use of Global Equipment.

由于涉案高管侵占公司资金约600万美元，导致重大误导性高管薪酬信息披露；

e.They contained materially misleading information regarding SAE’s transactions with Global Equipment by, for example, failing to disclose that Global Equipment was a sham rental equipment company created and controlled by the SAE Executives. For example, SAE’s 2015 Form 10­K, signed by Beatty and Whiteley, did not identify Global Equipment as a related party or disclose the approximately $6.8 million paid from SAE to Global Equipment that year. 

对SAE交易方GES公司的披露信息系重大误导性陈述；

g.SAE’s financial statements improperly included funds misappropriated by the SAE Executives as supposedly legitimate business expenses. For example, amounts stolen by Whiteley and paid to RVI and other fictitious entities were booked as legal or consulting expenses in SAE’s financial statements throughout the Relevant Period.

SAE财务报表将涉案高管侵占资金不恰当记为营业费用。

109.Hastings, Whiteley, and Beatty lied to SAE’s auditors, in connection with audits and reviews of SAE during the Relevant Period.

110.Specifically, Whiteley, Hastings, and Beatty signed management representation letters to SAE’s auditors that each knew contained material misstatements.

涉案高管向其审计师就审计审阅期间相关事宜撒谎，特别是高管声明书中包含大量重大不实陈述。

Concerned U.S. Securities Regulations

相关美国证券法规

从上述两个章节（蓝色底标注）“事实指控”和“SAE公开披露中的重大虚假、误导性陈述”，我们可知，其实SAE通过隐瞒关联方虚增收入的手段并不“高明”，在国内被处罚处分的上市公司中也常见类似操作；SEC指控SAE对财务报表所做的重大虚假、误导性陈述，也与国内类似。那么，大家可能会好奇，SAE和涉案高管将被索赔多少呢？

在SEC控诉状中，并未提及具体索赔金额，但SEC提起的救济请求事项多达18项，提到的被告违反的美国证券法规也很多，具体如下：

Securities Exchange Act of 1934:

Section20(e) [15 U.S.C.§ 77t(e)]

Section10(b) [15 U.S.C.§ 78j(b)] and Rules 10(b)-5(a) &(b)& (c) thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)&(b)&(c)]

Section 13(a) [15 U.S.C.§ 78m(a)] and Rules 13a-1&11&13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1&11&13]

Section 12b-20 [17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20]

Section 13(b)(2)(A)&(B) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A)&(B)]Section 13(b)(5) ) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(5)] and Rule 13b2-1 thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1]

Section 13b2-2 [17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2]Rule 13a-14 [17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14]

Section 21(d)(5) [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5)]

Securities Act of 1933

Section 17(a)(1)&(2)&(3) [15 U.S.C.§ 77q(a)(1)&(2)&(3)]

Section 15(b) [15 U.S.C.§ 77o(b)]

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)

Section 304(a)&(b) [15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)&(b)]

下面选与赔偿有关的法规作介绍，虽然我们不知道具体索赔总金额，但通过这些法规，可大概知道赔偿的“计算单价”。

Section 21(d) [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)]

(d)Injunction proceedings; authority of court to prohibit persons from serving as officers and directors; money penalties in civil actions

禁止令程序、禁止担任高管、董事；民事诉讼程序中金钱赔偿

(2)Authority of Court To Prohibit Persons From Serving as Officers and Directors.

禁止担任高管、董事

In any proceeding under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court may prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period of time as it shall determine, any person who violated section 78j(b) of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder from acting as an officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title or that is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title if the person’s conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.

本案中SAE和涉案高管的会计欺诈行为属于违反section 78j(b)的行为，对于违反section 78j(b)的个人，若法院认为其行为显示其已不适合担任上市公司高管或董事，法院可有条件或无条件的，决定其永久的或在某一期间内，禁止担任上市公司高管或董事。

(3) Money Penalties in Civil Actions.

民事诉讼程序中金钱赔偿

(A) Authority of commission.—Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, or a cease-and-desist order entered by the Commission pursuant to section 78u–3 of this title, other than by committing a violation subject to a penalty pursuant to section 78u–1 of this title, the Commission may bring an action in a United States district court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, upon a proper showing, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who committed such violation.

除section 78u-1关于内幕交易的处罚另有规定外，对于本章节下的违法行为（本案会计欺诈属于此情形）责任人，SEC可在美国地区法院提起民事赔偿。

(B)Amount of penalty.

赔偿金额

(i)First tier.——第一等级

The amount of the penalty shall be determined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances. For each violation, the amount of the penalty shall not exceed the greater of (I) $5,000 for a natural person or $50,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation.

就每一违法行为，处罚金额不超过两者中较大数额者：(I) 5000美元/自然人，或5万美元/法人；或 (II) 违法责任人因违法行为所获得的金钱收益。

(ii)Second tier.——第二等级

Notwithstanding clause (i), the amount of penalty for each such violation shall not exceed the greater of (I) $50,000 for a natural person or $250,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation, if the violation described in subparagraph (A) involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement.

若违法行为涉及欺诈、欺骗、操纵、有意或疏忽违反监管要求，处罚金额不超过两者中较大数额者：(I) 5万美元/自然人，或25万美元/法人；或 (II) 违法责任人因违法行为所获得的金钱收益。

(iii)Third tier.——第三等级

Notwithstanding clauses (i) and (ii), the amount of penalty for each such violation shall not exceed the greater of (I) $100,000 for a natural person or $500,000 for any other person, or (II) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to such defendant as a result of the violation, if—(aa)the violation described in subparagraph (A) involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement; and(bb)such violation directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a significant risk of substantial losses to other persons.

若违法行为涉及欺诈、欺骗、操纵或有意或疏忽违反监管要求，且违法行为导致他人巨大损失或使其面临巨大损失的重大风险，处罚金额不超过两者中较大数额者：(I) 10万美元/自然人，或50万美元/法人；或 (II) 违法责任人因违法行为所获得的金钱收益。

(D)Special provisions relating to a violation of a cease-and-desist order.

关于违反行政禁令的特定规定

In an action to enforce a cease-and-desist order entered by the Commission pursuant to section 78u–3 of this title, each separate violation of such order shall be a separate offense, except that in the case of a violation through a continuing failure to comply with the order, each day of the failure to comply shall be deemed a separate offense.

若违法责任人未遵守SEC发出的行为禁令，对行政禁令的每一次违反，视为一次违法行为（从上述条文，我们可知，赔偿金额以每一违法行为为计算单位，因此违法次数与赔偿金额直接相关）；若责任人持续不遵守行政禁令，则未遵守的每一天算一次违法行为。

(5)Equitable Relief.

衡平法救济

In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.

SEC可为投资人之利益向联邦法院提起衡平法救济。衡平法救济是前述金额赔偿之外的救济，通常会要求SAE和涉案高管进行或不进行某一特定行为。

SOX Section 304(a)&(b) [15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)&(b)]

(a)Additional compensation prior to noncompliance with Commission financial reporting requirements

财务报告被发现不合规前CEO和CFO所获报酬的返还

If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for

—若上市公司因重大违法违规导致财务报表重述（本案中SAE进行了财务报表重述），则CEO和CFO应向上市公司返还：

(1)any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and

上市公司被重述的财务报表公告后12个月期间所获得的奖金、激励性质或股权性质的报酬；以及

(2)any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period.

在该12个月期间将上市公司股票出售所获利润。

(b)Commission exemption authority

The Commission may exempt any person from the application of subsection (a), as it deems necessary and appropriate.

SEC可视情况必要和适当时豁免CEO、CFO返还前述款项。

Disgorge illgotten gains

退还非法收益

Ordering Defendants Hastings, Whiteley, Beatty, and Scott, and Relief Defendants O’Neill and Hastings, to disgorge, with prejudgment interest, all ill­gotten gains or unjust enrichment derived from Defendants’ illegal conduct as set forth in this Complaint;

除前述金额赔偿和CEO&CFO报酬返还外，SEC在控诉状中还要求涉案高管退还因违法行为所获得的一切非法收益、不当得利及利息。

其他

此外，SEC新闻稿(press release)披露，纽约南区Attorney’s Office将向Hastings(前CEO兼董事长)提起刑事指控。

本文SEC诉状来自：https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2020/comp-pr2020-251.pdf